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Abstract 
Although Darwinian models are rampant in the social 
sciences, social scientists do not face the problem that 
motivated Darwin’s theory of natural selection: the problem 
of explaining how lineages evolve despite that any traits they 
acquire are regularly discarded at the end of the lifetime of the 
individuals that acquired them. While the rationale for 
framing culture as an evolutionary process is correct, it does 
not follow that culture is a Darwinian or selectionist process, 
or that population genetics provides viable starting points for 
modeling cultural change. This paper lays out step-by-step 
arguments as to why a selectionist approach to cultural 
evolution is inappropriate, focusing on the lack of 
randomness, and lack of a self-assembly code. It summarizes 
an alternative evolutionary approach to culture: self-other 
reorganization via context-driven actualization of potential. 
Keywords: acquired trait; cultural evolution; inheritance; 
natural selection; population genetics; self-other re-
organization 
Introduction 
Though several of the deepest evolutionary thinkers of the 
20th Century cautioned against the over-zealous application 
of Darwinian theory (Claidière, Scott-Phillips, & Sperber, 
2014; Fracchia & Lewontin, 1999; Mayr, 1996; Tëmkin & 
Eldredge, 2007), Darwinian models are rampant in the 
social sciences. The frameworks of population genetics has 
been applied to cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 
1988; Brewer et al., 2017; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; 
Creanza, Kolodny, & Feldman, 2017; Henrich et al., 2016), 
as well as to archaeology (O’Brien & Lyman, 2000), 
economics (Essletzbichler, 2011; Hodgson, 2002; Nelson & 
Winter, 2002), neuroscience (Edelman, 2014), the evolution 
of languages (Fitch, 2005; Pagel, 2017), and the unfolding 
of a creative idea in the mind of an individual (Campbell, 
1960; Kronfeldner, 2014; Simonton, 1999; for counter-
arguments see Gabora, 2007, 2011a). This paper focuses 
exclusively on the question of whether cultural evolution is 
Darwinian. This is a different project from that of 
examining how natural selection has shaped the propensity 
for culture, language, artifacts, and so forth; it models 
cultural change itself as a second Darwinian process.  
The rationale is that since cultural forms, like biological 
forms, evolve, i.e., exhibit cumulative, adaptive, open-ended 
change, culture constitutes a second evolutionary process. 
This is undoubtedly true. However, cultural Darwinism goes 
further than the claim that culture evolves; it assumes that 
the formal framework of population genetics, with 
appropriate tinkering to accommodate culture-specific 
phenomena, provides a viable foundation for modeling this 
second evolutionary process. 
Many have laid out the similarities and differences 
between biological and cultural evolution (Godfrey-Smith, 
2012; Jablonka & Lamb, 2014; Mesoudi, 2007; Wagner & 
Rosen, 2014). The issue addressed here is not how similar 
they are, but the extent to which the algorithmic structure of 
cultural evolution merits importation of a Darwinian 
framework. This paper lays out two arguments against this 
project, breaking them down step by step so as to facilitate 
the identification and settling of any points of disagreement. 
The first, the weaker argument, pertains to the issue of 
randomness. The second pertains to the existence of a self-
assembly code. We will see that due to limited interaction 
with cognitive science, cultural evolution research has paid 
little attention to structure of the human minds that evolve 
culture, and the processes by which elements of culture take 
form. This has led to the misapplication of evolutionary 
concepts to culture, resulting in lack of appreciation of its 
essentially non-Darwinian character. The paper concludes 
with a brief discussion of an alternative, non-Darwinian 
evolutionary framework for culture. 
Definitions 
It is true that any definition of a term is fine so long as 
everyone agrees how it is being used. However, part of why 
it has been difficult to nail down the extent to which cultural 
forms evolve in the same sense as biological forms is that, 
in drawing parallels between biological and cultural 
evolution, existing terms have been stretched beyond their 
conventional meanings. When they are used in ways that do 
not capture the deep structure or essence of their original 
meaning, or when a biological referent is misleadingly 
retained in a cultural context, misunderstanding can result. 
The matter is tricky, for although cultural evolution 
constitutes a separate evolutionary process with its own 
evolving structures and processes, it is inextricably 
interwoven with biological evolution1. To maintain clarity, 
key terms used in this paper are defined below: 
Acquired trait: a trait obtained during the lifetime of its 
bearer (e.g., a scar, a tattoo, or a memory of a song) and 
transmitted horizontally (i.e., laterally).2 
Culture: extrasomatic adaptations—including behavior and 
artifacts—that are socially rather than sexually transmitted. 
1 For example, maternal diet during lactation can influence food 
preferences in offspring (Bilkó et al., 1994). 
2 These are acquired traits with respect to biological evolution. It 
will be argued that with respect to cultural evolution all traits are 
acquired. 
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Darwinian process: an evolutionary process that occurs 
through natural or artificial selection.3 
Darwinian threshold: transition from non-Darwinian to 
Darwinian evolutionary process (Woese, 2002; Vetsigian, 
Woese, & Goldenfeld, 2006). 
Evolutionary process: a process that exhibits cumulative, 
adaptive, open-ended change.  
Gene: a component of a self-assembly code, i.e., a unit of 
heredity.4 
Generation: a single transition period from the internalized 
to the externalized form of a trait.   
Horizontal transmission: The spread of a trait within a 
generation. 
Inherited trait: a trait (e.g., blood type, or the capacity to 
suntan) that is transmitted vertically (e.g., from parent to 
offspring) by way of a self-assembly code (e.g., DNA). 
Modern Synthesis: merging of Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection and Mendelian genetics in the 1940s. 
Organism: the living expression of a particular self-
assembly code, sometimes referred to as an ‘individual’. 
Phylogenetic network: model of the relationships amongst 
variants that is pictured as reticulate, or ‘network-like’. 
Phylogenetic tree: model of the relationships amongst 
different species that is pictured as branching, or ‘tree-like’. 
Population genetics: branch of biology central to which is 
a mathematical theory of how organisms evolve through 
natural selection due to changes in gene frequencies. It was 
originally developed by Fisher (1930), Wright (1931), and 
Haldane (1932) and subsequently expanded (Hartl & Clark, 
2006).  
Selection: differential replication of randomly generated 
heritable variation in a population over generations such that 
some traits become more prevalent than others. Selection 
may be natural (due to non-human elements of the 
environment) or artificial (due to human efforts such as 
selective breeding), and it can occur at multiple levels, e.g., 
genes, individuals, or groups (Lewontin, 1970). 
Selectionist process: like the term ‘Darwinian process’ this 
refers to an evolutionary process that occurs through natural 
or artificial selection. (It will be used from this point on 
because it avoids potential confusion caused by the fact that 
Darwin considered other possibilities.) 
Self-assembly code: a set of self-replication instructions. 
Self-other Reorganization (SOR): a theory of how both 
culture, and early life, evolve through communally 
                                                        
3 Although evolution by selection is the process Darwin’s name 
became most synonymous with, it is interesting to note that 
amongst his many musings was a theory of  pangenesis involving  
transmission of acquired traits (Darwin, 1868). 
4 In biology, the term ‘gene’ generally refers to a sequence of DNA 
or RNA nucleotides that code for a molecule with a particular 
function. It will be argued that, with respect to cultural evolution, 
there is no self-assembly code, and thus no equivalent to the 
gene. 
exchanging, self-organizing networks that generate new 
components through their interactions. Based on post-
Modern Synthesis theory and findings in biology. 
Vertical transmission: The inheritance of a trait from one 
generation to the next by way of a self-assembly code. 
It is important to point out that we are using the term 
‘selection’ in its technical, scientific sense. The word 
‘selection’ also has an ‘everyday’ sense in which it is 
synonymous with ‘choosing’ or ‘picking out’. One could 
say that selection—in the everyday sense of the term—
occurs in a competitive marketplace through the winnowing 
out superior products. However, the discussion here 
concerns whether selection in the scientific sense of the term 
is applicable to cultural evolution. 
Note that, with respect to biological evolution, a new 
generation (one transmission event) generally (though not in 
horizontal gene transfer) begins with the birth of an 
organism. It is not impossible for the same trait to be 
transmitted horizontally in one generation and vertically in 
another. However, with respect to cultural evolution, a new 
generation begins with the expression of an idea (again, one 
transmission event). Thus, over the course of a single 
discussion, an idea (a cultural trait) can undergo many 
generations. It can be said that cultural evolution proceeds 
more quickly than human biological evolution5, since the 
lengthy period we associate with biological generations, 
from birth through development to puberty and reproductive 
maturity to parenthood, is in general significantly longer 
than the stretch of time between when an individual acquires 
a cultural trait (e.g., an idea) and then expresses (their own 
version of, or their own take on) that cultural trait.  
Note also that vertical and horizontal transmission must 
be defined with respect to the relevant evolutionary process. 
A common error is to refer to the transmission of cultural 
information from parent to offspring as vertical transmission 
(e.g., Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). The parent-child 
relationship is with respect to biological evolution; they are 
parent and child with respect to their status as biologically 
evolving organisms, but with respect to their status as 
participants in cultural evolution, there is no basis for this 
parent-child distinction. Indeed, while childbirth entails one 
mother and one father, there is no limit to the number of 
‘parental influences’ on the ‘birth’ of an idea.  
A related error is to say that in cultural evolution there is a 
third form of transmission, oblique transmission, in which 
traits are transmitted from non-kin members of the parental 
generation (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981), for as far 
as cultural evolution is concerned it is irrelevant whether the 
information comes from biological kin or non-kin.  
In a similar vein, although dual inheritance theorists 
speak of culture as a second form of inheritance (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2007; Richerson & Boyd, 1978; Whiten, 2017; 
Müller, 2017), the distinguishing feature of an inherited trait 
is that it is transmitted vertically—e.g., from parent to 
                                                        
5 We are not referring here to clock time but to the relative mean 
duration of biological versus cultural generation processes. 
offspring—by way of a self-assembly code (e.g., DNA), and 
therefore not obliterated at the end of a generation. This is 
not the case with respect to cultural traits (Gabora, 2011b). 
(Nor, as we shall see, is it even the case for all biological 
traits.)  
As a final preliminary note, it is important to keep in mind 
that organisms (including humans) are affected by 
epigenetic processes that influence the regulation and 
expression of genetic traits  due to interactions with the 
environment, as well as selection effects operating on 
groups as well as individuals (Wilson, 1975). For simplicity, 
this paper does not explore these complications in detail but 
their relevance to the argument presented here is discussed 
elsewhere (Voorhees, Read, & Gabora, in press). 
Randomness 
It is possible for a selectionist model to be applicable even if 
the underlying process is not random, but in that case, 
although not genuinely random, the process must be 
approximated by a random distribution.6 Biological 
variation is not genuinely random (for example, we can 
trace the source of some mutations to various causal agents; 
see Caporale 2000) but the assumption of randomness 
generally holds sufficiently well to serve as a useful 
approximation.7  
With respect to culture, variation is not randomly 
generated, nor can it be described by a random distribution. 
Selectionist cultural theorists sometimes concede this point 
(Heyes, 2018), but fail to recognize its implications for the 
assumed validity of a selectionist framework. Natural 
selection acts upon nonrandomly generated variation, but to 
the extent that variation is not randomly generated, the 
distribution of variants reflects whatever is biasing the 
generation away from random in the first place, rather than 
selection (i.e., differential selection on the distribution of 
randomly generated heritable variation in a population over 
generations). Let us break this argument down step by step. 
1. Natural selection is a two-step process, consisting of (i) 
generation of random variants that differ in fitness, 
followed by (ii) differential survival and reproduction of 
the fittest variants.  
2. The first step provides variation upon which selection 
can operate, and the adaptiveness of the process resides 
not in the first step (how variants are generated) but the 
second (how fit variants are selected). 
3. To the extent that variants do not differ in fitness, their 
evolution is attributed not to selection but to random 
genetic drift (Fisher, 1930; Hartl & Clark, 2006).8 
                                                        
6 Few things other than radioactive decay are truly random. 
7
 Actually, in some biological situations, such as assortative mating, 
the assumption of randomness does not hold, and in such cases 
natural selection is not an appropriate model. 
8 Drift has been demonstrated in human culture (Bentley, Hahn, & 
Shennan, 2004), and in a computational model of cultural 
evolution (Gabora, 1995). 
4. To the extent that the generation of variants cannot be 
described by a random distribution, their evolution is 
attributed not to selection but to the nature of this 
nonrandom generation process. 
5. Cultural change cannot be approximated by a random 
distribution; it is orders of magnitude more non-random 
than biological evolution. It is strategic and creative, 
with ideas emerging due to spreading activation and 
overlap amongst distributed mental representations 
encoded in associative memory (Gabora, 2011a). 
6. Therefore, a selectionist model is inappropriate to the 
description of cultural change.  
In the cultural Darwinism literature there is much 
discussion of social learning (obtaining existing information 
from someone else), and some mention of individual 
learning (obtaining existing information through nonsocial 
means), but little about creativity, reasoning, planning, 
problem solving, i.e., the the highly non-random higher 
cognitive processes that generate cultural novelty. In a 
paper titled “grand challenges for the study of cultural 
evolution” (Brewer et al., 2017), absent from among the 
eight challenges is the challenge of studying the creative 
processes that fuel cultural evolution. The closest they come 
is to ask “How are innovations selectively transmitted” and 
“Do innovations create feedback loops leading to 
cumulative culture?” It seems that understanding how 
innovations come about in the first place is more 
fundamental than knowing how they are “selectively 
transmitted” or whether they create feedback loops. Without 
the creative generation of cultural novelty, there is no 
cultural evolution. As demonstrated in an agent-based 
computational model of cultural evolution (Gabora, 1995); 
when agents never imitate, cultural evolution does occur, 
albeit slowly, as each agent figures things out on its own, 
but when agents never create, there is no cultural evolution 
at all. Thus, understanding creativity would appear to be the 
‘grandest’ challenge of all for cultural evolution research. 
The ‘randomness’ argument puts a major dent in the 
theory that cultural evolution is selectionist, but it does not 
destroy it altogether. It is possible that after variation has 
been generated by way of nonrandom processes there might 
still be work for selection to do in winnowing out the very 
fittest. However, we now turn to the more serious problem, 
that in cultural evolution there is no self-assembly code.  
Self-assembly Code 
In biological evolution there are two kinds of traits: (1) 
inherited traits (e.g., blood type), transmitted vertically from 
parent to offspring by way of genes, and (2) acquired traits 
(e.g., a tattoo), obtained during an organism’s lifetime, and 
transmitted horizontally amongst conspecifics.9 A 
selectionist explanation works in biology to the extent that 
retention of acquired change is negligible compared to 
                                                        
9 This is a simplification, for there exist traits that are encoded in 
genetic material, but this genetic material does not constitute a 
full-fledged self-assembly code (see Bonduriansky & Day, 2009). 
retention of selected change; otherwise the first, which can 
operate instantaneously, overwhelms the second, which 
takes generations. Transmission of acquired traits is avoided 
through use of a self-assembly code (such as the genetic 
code), i.e., a set of instructions for how to reproduce. 
Because a lineage perpetuates itself using a self-assembly 
code, inherited traits are transmitted while acquired traits are 
not.10  
Now let us turn to culture. In cultural evolution, there is 
no self-assembly code, and no vertically transmitted 
inherited traits; all change is acquired.11 Therefore, cultural 
evolution is not due to the mechanism Darwin proposed: 
differential replication of heritable variation in response to 
selection. The only response to this argument I know of 
comes from Mesoudi (2007): “[the] point concerning the 
lack of self-assembly codes in cultural entities is, again, 
well-taken when compared to many biological organisms, 
but may not hold if we take viruses as our biological 
exemplar, which similarly cannot self-replicate in the 
absence of a host, or … the evolution of early RNA-based 
life before DNA-based replication mechanisms evolved.” 
This response evades the problem, for the argument is not 
that cultural evolution differs from biological evolution, but 
that the assumptions underlying the formal framework 
developed to describe evolution by natural selection renders 
it inapplicable to culture. Indeed, it is also inapplicable to 
the description of some aspects of biological evolution, but 
that should be more reason for concern, not less. 
Thus, to help determine whether there is a genuine flaw in 
the argument, and if so pinpoint what that flaw is, we again 
break the argument down into steps: 
1. To the extent that an evolutionary process is amenable to 
a selectionist model, there are two kinds of traits: 
vertically transmitted inherited traits, and horizontally 
transmitted acquired traits. 
2. Acquired traits are discarded from a lineage at the end of 
every generation. 
                                                        
10 An organism may bypass the disappearance of acquired traits 
through niche construction, i.e., by modifying its environment in 
such a way as to influence the behavior (and potentially gene 
regulation) of offspring. Thus, by ‘building acquired traits into 
the environment’, one generation may influence the traits 
exhibited by the next (Lewontin, 1998). However, acquired 
change is sufficiently negligible relative to inherited change that 
a selectionist explanation is still of value in explaining biological 
evolution. 
11 An anonymous reviewer suggested natural language is a cultural 
self-assembly code. However, (1) natural language is not a set of 
encoded instructions for the self-replication of natural languages, 
and (2) culture does not exhibit the signature characteristics of 
evolution by way of a self-assembly code: lack of transmission  
of acquired traits, and culture is characterized by horizontal not 
vertical transmission. Nevertheless, culture may be moving 
toward a cultural Darwinian threshold. In other words, it may 
exist in the state biological life was in before LUCA (last 
universal common ancestor) (Woese, 1998). 
3. This means that evolution (i.e., cumulative, open-ended, 
adaptive change) in biological lineages cannot be 
explained in terms of acquired traits. 
4. Therefore, it is explained in terms of inherited traits. 
5. In biological evolution, inherited traits are not discarded; 
they are preserved by way of a self-assembly code. The 
code’s low-level information-bearing components must 
be organized in an orderly manner so they can be parsed 
into meaningful units; otherwise, the precisely 
orchestrated process by which the code is expressed to 
generate offspring is disrupted. 
6. The population genetics framework was developed to 
explain change in a system such as this where the slow 
process of selection for inherited traits over generations 
is not drowned out by the fast process of acquired 
change (which can take place over milliseconds). 
7. Biological evolution is therefore explainable in terms of 
differential selection on the distribution of randomly 
generated heritable variation in a population over 
generations, i.e., natural selection. 
8. Since acquired change operates markedly faster than 
inherited change, to the extent that acquired change is 
not wiped out at the end of each generation, a population 
genetics framework is inappropriate as an explanatory 
model. 
9. In cultural evolution, there is no distinction between 
vertically transmitted inherited traits and horizontally 
transmitted acquired traits. Since all traits are 
horizontally transmitted, we may refer to them as 
cultural acquired traits. 
10. Cultural acquired traits are not regularly discarded from 
cultural lineages at the end of generations. 
11. This means that evolution (i.e., cumulative, open-ended, 
adaptive change) in cultural lineages can be explained in 
terms of acquired traits. 
12. Moreover, culture is not transmitted by way of inherited 
traits. 
13. Therefore, cultural change, unlike biological change, 
cannot be explained in terms of change in the frequency 
of inherited traits; there exists no basis upon which to 
explain cultural evolution in terms of differential 
selection of inherited traits on the distribution of 
randomly generated heritable variation in a population 
over generations, i.e., using a selectionist framework. 
14. Cultural evolution must therefore be explained entirely 
in terms of changes to acquired traits. 
This argument has important implications for how 
cultural data is modeled. Since biological acquired traits are 
usually (though not always) discarded, and since a self-
assembly code must stay intact to preserve its self-
replication capacity, the joining of bifurcations in biological 
lineages is rare; thus, a phylogenetic tree correctly captures 
the branching structure. However, since cultural acquired 
traits are not discarded, and there is no cultural self-
assembly code, the joining of bifurcations in cultural 
‘lineages’ is commonplace, and thus the structure is 
network-like rather than the tree-like (Gabora, 2006b). This 
difference has been demonstrated mathematically using 
split-decomposition graphs (Bandelt & Dress, 1992; 
Wägele, 2005). Dress and colleagues showed that while 
biological data generate branching graphs, reanalysis of data 
from a psychological experiment in which people were 
asked to estimate the subjective distance between colours 
gives a very different structure (Dress, Huson, & Moulton, 
1996). This difference in the deep structure of biological 
data and cultural data such as languages, concepts, and 
artifacts arising from human cognition, is why phylogenetic 
tree models of culture are problematic. 
Self-Other Reorganization (SOR): An 
Alternative Approach to Cultural Evolution 
The above analysis precludes a selectionist but not an 
evolutionary framework for culture. Indeed, research since 
the Modern Synthesis has shown that even life itself is only 
partially explained through recourse to a selectionist 
framework; for example, though biological traits are 
generally obtained through vertical inheritance, horizontal 
gene transfer (HGT) involves horizontal transmission 
(Ochman et al., 2000). Evolution can occur in the absence of 
selection, and the importance of non-selectionist processes 
in evolution is increasingly recognized (Kauffman, 1993; 
Killeen, 2017; Woese, 2002). Research on the origin of life 
suggests that early life consisted of autocatalytic protocells 
that evolved through a non-selectionist means, and natural 
selection emerged later from this more haphazard, ancestral 
evolutionary process (Baum, 2018; Cornish-Bowden & 
Cárdenas, 2017; Gabora, 2006; Goldenfeld, Biancalani, & 
Jafarpour, 2017; Hordijk, Steel, & Dittrich, 2018; Steel, 
2000; Vetsigian, Woese, & Goldenfeld, 2006). This non-
selectionist process requires (1) a self-organizing network of 
components that generate new components through their 
interactions, (2) the network should be able to reconstitute 
another like itself through haphazard (not code-driven) 
duplication of components, and (3) interaction amongst 
networks. This process can be referred to as Self-Other 
Reorganization (SOR) because it involves an interplay 
between self-organized internal restructuring, and 
communal exchange amongst autocatalytic structures. 
Change occurs not through selection but through a process 
that has a completely different mathematical description: 
context-driven actualization of potential (Gabora & Aerts, 
2005). The entity changes through interactions with its 
world, which in turn alters its potential for future 
configurations. Like selectionist evolution, SOR has 
mechanisms for preserving continuity and for introducing 
novelty, but unlike selectionist evolution, it is a low-fidelity 
Lamarckian process. The distinction between these two 
processes is summarized in Table One. 
Vetsigian et al. (2006) showed that to cross the Darwinian 
threshold from non-selectionist to selectionist evolution 
requires the emergence of a self-assembly code. There is no 
evidence that culture has crossed this threshold, and it does 
not possess the sine qua non of having crossed it: vertical 
transmission and a lack of transmission of acquired traits. It 
has been proposed that, as did early life, culture evolves 
through SOR (sometimes referred to as ‘communal 
exchange’) (Gabora, 1999, 2004, 2019). Here, the self-
organizing networks are not protocells exchanging catalytic 
molecules, but minds exchanging ideas. Tools improve and 
fashions change not through selection but through context-
driven actualization of potential. As parents and others share 
knowledge with children, an integrated network of 
understandings takes shape in their minds, and they become 
creative contributors to cultural evolution. It has been noted 
that a tension exists between cultural evolution theory and 
the literature on human nature (Lewens, 2017). Because 
SOR is not incompatible with the transmission of acquired 
traits, and because it recognizes the integrated, ‘self-
mending’ nature of an individual mind, it provides a natural 
means of reconciling cultural evolution and human nature. 
That said, SOR is but one of a class of network-based 
approaches (e.g., Bentley & Shennan, 2003), and other non-
selectionist models of cultural evolution, such as those 
based on the Price equation (e.g., El Mouden, André, Morin, 
& Nettle, 2014). 
 
Table One: Summary of the distinction between evolution 
through selection and evolution through Self-Other 
Reorganization. 
 
 Selection Self-other Re-
organization 
(SOR) 
Unit of self-
replication 
Organism Self-organizing 
autocatalytic 
network 
Mechanism for 
preserving 
continuity 
Reproduction 
(vertical 
transmission), 
proofreading 
enzymes, etc. 
Communal 
exchange 
(horizontal 
transmission) 
Generation of 
novelty 
Mutation, 
recombination 
Creativity, 
transmission error 
Self-assembly 
code  
DNA or RNA None 
High fidelity Yes No 
Transmission of 
acquired traits 
No Yes 
Type  Selectionist Lamarckian (by 
some standards) 
Evolution 
processes it can 
explain 
Biological  Early life; 
horizontal gene 
transfer, culture 
Conclusions 
Darwin faced the problem of explaining how lineages 
evolve despite that acquired changes are lost from a lineage 
when the individuals that acquired them dies. Darwin’s 
solution was to come up with a population-level (macro) 
explanation. His theory of natural selection holds that 
although acquired traits are discarded, inherited traits are 
retained, so evolution can be explained in terms of 
preferential selection for those inherited traits that confer 
fitness benefits on their bearers. Cultural evolution research 
does not face the problem that motivated Darwin’s 
solution—that of explaining how evolution takes place 
despite the discarding of acquired traits—because cultural 
acquired traits are not discarded. Thus, while the rationale 
for framing culture as an evolutionary process is correct, it 
does not follow that culture is a selectionist process, or that 
population genetics provides viable starting points for 
modeling cultural change. Cultural evolution research has 
been carried out largely independent of research on the 
mental structures that actually evolve culture. This has led 
to the mis-application of biological constructs such as 
generations, inheritance, and vertical / horizontal 
transmission. This in turn has hindered appreciation of the 
dependence of vertical inheritance on a self-assembly code, 
and recognition of the implications of its absence in cultural 
evolution. The field is in need of cognitive scientists to 
uncover the cognitive processes by which culture actually 
takes shape. 
Psychologists use the term mental set to refer to the 
persistent use of problem-solving strategies that worked in 
the past even when these strategies are not appropriate to the 
problem at hand. It appears that the persistent application of 
a selectionist framework to cultural evolution, despite that 
the conditions that make that framework applicable in 
biology are not present with respect to culture, may be an 
instance of mental set. This paper has laid out step-by-step 
arguments as to why a selectionist approach to culture is 
inappropriate, and pointed to an alternative approach. 
Acknowledgments 
This work was supported by a grant (62R06523) from the 
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of 
Canada. 
References  
Bandelt, H., & Dress, A. (1992). Split decomposition: A 
new and useful approach to phylogenetic analysis of 
distance data. Molecular Phylogenetics and Evolution, 1, 
242-252. 
Baum, D. (2018). The origin and early evolution of life in 
chemical composition space. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 456, 295-304.  
Bentley, R., Hahn, M. W., & Shennan, S. J. (2004). Random 
drift and culture change. Proceedings of the Royal Society 
B: Biological Sciences, 271, 1443-1450.  
Bentley, R., & Shennan, S. (2003). Cultural transmission 
and stochastic network growth. American Antiquity, 68, 
459-485. 
Bilkó, Á., Altbäcker, V., & Hudson, R. (1994). Transmission 
of food preference in the rabbit: the means of information 
transfer. Physiology & Behavior, 56, 907-912. 
Bonduriansky, R., & Day, T. (2009). Nongenetic inheritance 
and its evolutionary implications. Annual Review of 
Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics, 40, 103-125. 
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. (1988). Culture and the 
evolutionary process. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Brewer, J., Gelfand, M., Jackson, J. C., MacDonald, I. F., 
Peregrine, P. N., Richerson, P. J., … Wilson, D. S. 
(2017). Grand challenges for the study of cultural 
evolution. Nature Ecology & Evolution, 1, 10-1038. 
Campbell, D. (1960). Blind variation and selective retention 
in creative thought as in other knowledge processes. 
Psychological Review, 67, 380-400.  
Caporale, L. (2000). Mutation is modulated: Implications 
for evolution. BioEssays, 22, 388-395.  
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., & Feldman, M. W. (1981). Cultural 
Transmission and evolution: A quantitative approach. 
Princeton NJ:  Princeton University Press. 
Claidière, N., Scott-Phillips, T. C., & Sperber, D. (2014). 
How Darwinian is cultural evolution? Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B, 369, 20130368. 
Cornish-Bowden, A., & Cárdenas, M. L. (2017). Life before 
LUCA. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 434, 68-74. 
Creanza, N., Kolodny, O., & Feldman, M. W. (2017). 
Cultural evolutionary theory: How culture evolves and 
why it matters. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 114, 7782-7789. 
Darwin, C. (1868). The variation of animals and plants 
under domestication. London: John Murray. 
Dress, A., Huson, D., & Moulton, V. (1996). Analyzing and 
visualizing sequence and distance data using SplitsTree. 
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 71, 95-109. 
Edelman, G. (2014). Neural Darwinism. New Perspectives 
Quarterly, 31, 25-27. 
El Mouden, C., André, J. B., Morin, O., & Nettle, D. (2014). 
Cultural transmission and the evolution of human 
behaviour: A general approach based on the Price 
equation. Journal of Evolutionary Biology, 27, 231-241. 
Fisher, R. A. (1930). The genetical theory of natural 
selection. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Fitch, W. (2005). The evolution of language: A comparative 
review. Biology and Philosophy, 20, 193-203. 
Fracchia, J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1999). Does culture 
evolve? History and Theory, 38, 52-78.  
Gabora, L. (1995). Meme and variations: A computational 
model of cultural evolution. In 1993 Lectures in complex 
systems. Addison Wesley. 
Gabora, L. (1999). Weaving, bending, patching, mending 
the fabric of reality: A cognitive science perspective on 
worldview inconsistency. Found Science, 3, 395–428. 
Gabora, L. (2004). Ideas are not replicators but minds are. 
Biology and Philosophy, 19, 127-143. 
Gabora, L. (2006a). Self-other organization: Why early life 
did not evolve through natural selection. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology, 241, 441-450. 
Gabora, L. (2006b). The fate of evolutionary archaeology: 
survival or extinction? World Archaeology, 38, 690-696.
Gabora, L. (2007). Why the creative process is not 
Darwinian. Creativity Research Journal, 19, 361–365.  
Gabora, L. (2011a). An analysis of the blind variation and 
selective retention theory of creativity. Creativity 
Research Journal, 23, 155-165.  
Gabora, L. (2011b). Five clarifications about cultural 
evolution. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 11, 61-83. 
Gabora, L. (2019). Creativity: linchpin in the quest for a 
viable theory of cultural evolution. Current Opinion in 
Behavioral Sciences, 27, 77-83. 
Gabora, L., & Aerts, D. (2005). Evolution as context-driven 
actualisation of potential: toward an interdisciplinary 
theory of change of state. Interdisciplinary Science 
Reviews, 30, 69-88. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2012). Darwinism and cultural change. 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London B: Biological Sciences, 367, 2160-2170. 
Goldenfeld, N., Biancalani, T., & Jafarpour, F. (2017). 
Universal biology and the statistical mechanics of early 
life. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 
375, 20160341. 
Haldane, J. B. S. (1932). The causes of evolution. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hartl, D. L., & Clark, A. G. (2006). Principles of population 
genetics, Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press. 
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Derex, M., Kline, M., Mesoudi, A., 
Muthukrishna, M., … Thomas, M. (2016). Understanding 
cumulative cultural evolution. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 113, E6724-E6725. 
Henrich, J., & McElreath, R. (2007). Dual-inheritance 
theory: the evolution of human cultural capacities and 
cultural evolution. Oxford UK: Oxford handbook of 
evolutionary psychology. 
Heyes, C. (2018). Enquire within: cultural evolution and 
cognitive science. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373, 20170051. 
Hodgson, G. (2002). Darwinism in economics: from 
analogy to ontology. Journal Evolutionary Economics, 
12, 259-281. 
Hordijk, W., Steel, M., & Dittrich, P. (2018). Autocatalytic 
sets and chemical organizations: Modeling self-sustaining 
reaction networks at the origin of life. New Journal of 
Physics, 20, 015011. 
Jablonka, E., & Lamb, M. J. (2014). Evolution in four 
dimensions (revised). Boston: MIT press. 
Kauffman, S. (1993). Origins of order. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Killeen, P. (2019). The non-Darwinian evolution of behavers 
and behaviors. Behavioural Processes, 161, 45-53. 
Kronfeldner, M. (2014). Darwinian creativity and memetics. 
Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge. 
Lewens, T. (2017). Human nature, human culture: The case 
of cultural evolution. Interface Focus, 7, 20170018.  
Lewontin, R. (1970). The units of selection. Annual review 
of ecology and systematics, 1, 1-18. 
Lewontin, R. (1998). The evolution of cognition: Questions 
we will never answer.  In Scarborough, S. Sternberg, & 
D. Osherson, (Eds.) An invitation to cognitive 
science, vol. 4, (pp. 107-132). Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Mayr, E. (1996). What is a species, and what is not? 
Philosophy of Science, 63, 262-277.  
Mesoudi, A. (2007). Biological and cultural evolution: 
Similar but Different. Biological Theory, 2, 119-123.  
Mesoudi, A. (2016). Cultural evolution: Integrating 
psychology, evolution and culture. Current Opinion in 
Psychology, 7, 17-22. 
Mesoudi, A. (2017). Pursuing Darwin’s curious parallel: 
Prospects for a science of cultural evolution. Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences, 114, 7853-7860. 
Müller, G. B. (2017). Why an extended evolutionary 
synthesis is necessary. Interface Focus, 7, 20170015. 
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. (2002). Evolutionary theorizing in 
economics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 23-46. 
O’Brien, M., & Lyman, R. (2000). Applying evolutionary 
archaeology: A systematic approach. Berlin: Springer. 
Ochman, H., Lawrence, J., & Groisman, E. (2000). Lateral 
gene transfer and the nature of bacterial innovation. 
Nature, 405, 299-304.  
Pagel, M. (2017). Darwinian perspectives on the evolution 
of human languages. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 
151-157. 
Richerson, P., & Boyd, R. (1978). A dual inheritance model 
of the human evolutionary process I: Basic postulates and 
a simple model. Journal of Social and Biological 
Structures, 1, 127-154. 
Simonton, D. (1999). Origins of genius: Darwinian 
perspectives on creativity. Oxford University Press. 
Steel, M. (2000). The emergence of a self-catalyzing 
structure in abstract origin-of-life models. Applied 
Mathematics Letters, 13, 91-95. 
Tëmkin, I., & Eldredge, N. (2007). Phylogenetics and 
material cultural evolution. Current Anthropology, 48, 
146-154. 
Vetsigian, K., Woese, C., & Goldenfeld, N. (2006). 
Collective evolution and the genetic code. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 103, 10696-10701. 
Voorhees, B., Read, D., & Gabora, L. (in press). Identity, 
kinship, and the evolution of cooperation. Current 
Anthropology.  
Wägele, J. W. (2005). Foundations of phylogenetic 
systematics. München: Pfeil. 
Wagner, A., & Rosen, W. (2014). Spaces of the possible: 
universal Darwinism and the wall between technological 
and biological innovation. Journal of the Royal Society 
Interface, 11, 20131190. 
Whiten, A. (2017). A second inheritance system: the 
extension of biology through culture. Interface Focus, 7, 
20160142.  
Woese, C. (1998). The universal ancestor. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 95, 6854-6859. 
Woese, C. (2002). On the evolution of cells. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 99, 8742-8747. 
Wright, S. (1931). Evolution in Mendelian populations. 
Genetics, 16, 97-159. 
